



***ANOMİE* AS POLITICS: A COMPARISON BETWEEN DURKHEIM AND RANCIÈRE**

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ABSTRACT: This paper aims at comparing Emile Durkheim's concept of *anomie* with Jacques Rancière's understanding of politics. Durkheim takes *anomie* as an exceptional and pathological case, which disrupts the healthy, functioning society. Rancière makes a distinction between politics and *police*, the latter of which he argues is the conventional understanding of politics since the antiquity. This paper will firstly introduce the concept of *anomie* and Rancière's understanding of politics. In this way, it will be presented that Durkheim's functionalist and organistic approach to society corresponds to the *police* order in terms of Rancière's understanding and the concept of *anomie* corresponds to Rancière's understanding of politics.

Keywords: Emile Durkheim, Jacques Rancière, *anomie*, *police*, politics

SİYASET OLARAK *ANOMİ*: DURKHEIM VE RANCIÈRE ARASINDA BİR KARŐILAŐTIRMA

ÖZ: Bu makale Emile Durkheim'in anomi kavramı ile Jacques Rancière'in siyaset anlayıőını karŐılaőtırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Durkheim anomiyi, sađlıklı iŐleyen toplumu bozan istisnai ve patolojik bir durum olarak ele alır. Rancière ise siyaset ve polis arasında bir ayırım yapar ve ikincisinin antik çağlardan bu yana geleneksel siyaset anlayıőı olduđunu savunur. Bu makale öncelikle anomi kavramını ve Rancière'in siyaset anlayıőını tanıtacaktır. Böylelikle Durkheim'in işlevselci ve organistik toplum yaklaşımının Rancière'in anlayıőı açısından polis düzenine, anomi kavramının da Rancière'in siyaset anlayıőına karŐılık geldiđi ortaya konulacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Emile Durkheim, Jacques Rancière, *anomi*, *polis*, siyaset

1. INTRODUCTION

The dichotomy between the social order and disorder have been a crucial issue both in politics and sociology. Emile Durkheim's concept of *anomie* and Jacques Rancière's distinction between police and politics could be useful for analyzing this issue. Durkheim, a pioneering French sociologist and one of the founders of sociology as an academic discipline, is known for his functionalist approach that views society as an organism composing of parts that have crucial roles for the whole. In connection with that approach, he introduces the concept of *anomie*, which refers "to the decline that takes place in the regulatory functions of society and social institutions during industrial development when the capacity of society to set the necessary level of social restraint begins to weaken" (Morrison, 2006: 224). In this sense, *anomie* corresponds to a pathological state of deregulation and normlessness that disrupts the harmonious functioning of society.

On the other hand, Rancière brings a major criticism to traditional political thought through his redefinition of politics itself. His distinction between police and politics is central to this criticism. In this sense, police represents the hierarchical structuring of society that attributes roles to the parts of society and therefore maintains the order while politics represents the disruptive force that challenges and creates a rupture within the order represented by the police.

This paper aims to compare the distinctions made by the two thinkers: Durkheim's distinction between the normal and the pathological state called *anomie* and Rancière's distinction between the police, and politics which represents the rare ruptures in the former. Through this comparison, the paper aims to present that Durkheim's functionalist and organistic approach to society corresponds to the police in terms of Rancière's understanding and the concept of *anomie* corresponds to Rancière's understanding of politics.

To start, Emile Durkheim argues that conflict "can only arise in rare and pathological cases, which cannot persist without being dangerous" (Durkheim, 2002: 36). Although this is a remark regarding the cases in which custom does not comply with law, which embodies social solidarity, it would not be far from truth to suggest that this remark might be generalized in the sense that conflict is a rare and pathological event for Durkheim due to his functionalist approach. Whitney Pope gives a definition of functionalist as follows:

...one who (1) views society as a whole composed of interrelated parts (i.e., as a system), (2) assumes a tendency toward system equilibrium, (3) considers how society or the social order is possible and, hence, (4) views structures in terms of their contributions to the perpetuation or evolutionary development of society, and (5) sees pervasive commonalities or consensus as the ultimate basis of social order (Pope, 1975: 361).

In connection with this definition, "Functionalism is the sociological perspective that analyses how social institutions contribute to the working of society as a whole" (Easthope, 2017: 58). Likewise, functionalism is a "theory based on the premise that all aspects of a society – institutions, roles, norms, etc – serve a purpose and that all are indispensable for the long-term survival of the society" (Britannica, 2024). This functionalist approach, of course, closely related with an organistic one.

In this regard, a vision of society which is a whole composed of interrelated parts and which tends towards equilibrium requires to consider possible deviations as rare and pathological events, as *anomies*. While equilibrium indicates a healthy condition, *anomie* points out to a pathological condition. Durkheim defines the state of *anomie* with reference to deregulation: "if the division of labour does not produce solidarity, it is because the relationships between the organs are not regulated; they are in a state of *anomie*" (Durkheim, 2002: 56). In addition to taking *anomie* as a state that exists in terms of the division of labor, Durkheim employs it while discussing suicide. For example, he states that "Every disturbance of equilibrium, even though it may involve greater comfort and a raising of the general pace of life, provides an impulse to voluntary death" (Durkheim, 2002: 109). He, further, associates this 'social fact' to the egoism of the individual, which in a time of deregulation, an *anomie*, leads to that "One no longer knows what is fair, what are legitimate claims and hopes, and which are excessive" (Durkheim, 2002: 110).

Furthermore, Durkheim makes a distinction between the normal and the pathological, which is an analogy derived from medicine: "The sociologist studying society, he proposes, in roughly the same

manner as a physician examining the human body, can discriminate between health and sickness, between the ‘normal’ and the ‘pathological’” (Royce, 2015: 67) According to Royce, Durkheim suggests two criteria in order to depict the normal: the generality criterion and the consistency criterion. Generality criterion means that “a social fact is normal ... if it is found in all or most societies of a similar type...”, while consistency criterion indicates that “a social fact is normal ... only if it accords with the immanent logic of society, with its essential ‘conditions of existence’” (Royce, 2015: 67).

However, it should be noted that what will be discussed in this paper is not *anomie*, or conflict per se but the pathological and rare characteristics which are assigned to them by Durkheim. It is quite clear that Durkheim’s main concern underlying his specification of *anomies* and pathological cases which occur rarely is his emphasis on solidarity and equilibrium. Taking *anomie* in the case of division of labor into consideration, he argues that the societies which employ too many civil servants, officers or soldiers prove to be the examples of a pathological case. In other words, these cases become evident in the case of deregulation, normlessness. The idea underlying this, on the other hand, is that the rules regulating a society or the rules regarding a social fact function in a proper way to maintain that society or social fact. In the event of an *anomie*, either these rules disappear or they begin not to apply in the given case. However, it should be noted that in addition to the fact that to define a case pathological or an *anomie* is to marginalize it, to specify the normal and to distinguish it from the pathological is an ordering, a classification which, as will be argued in this paper, implies a general ordering and classification with regard to society.

The problem of *anomie* as a pathological and rare case will be examined with reference to Jacques Rancière’s understanding of politics and political. His distinction between *police* and politics proves to be significant here. To start with,

Politics exists because those who have no right to be counted as speaking beings make themselves of some account, setting up a community by the fact of placing in common a wrong that is nothing more than this very confrontation, the contradiction of two worlds in a single world: the world where they are and the world where they are not, the world where there is something "between" them and those who do not acknowledge them as speaking beings who count and the world where there is nothing (Rancière, 1998, 27).

Rancière, in this sense, makes a distinction between two modes of being-together. The first one specifies the parts of the society based on whether they have the capacity of speech or mere voice and through this specification assigns their roles and positions within the society. In this way, every part of the society gets his due depending on their position. On the other hand, the second mode disrupts this order depending on the equality of anyone to anyone. “Politics is generally seen as the set of procedures whereby the aggregation and consent of collectivities is achieved, the organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the systems for legitimizing this distribution” (Rancière, 1998: 28). Rancière calls this traditional understanding of politics the *police*. Politics, on the other hand, is reserved for “whatever breaks with the tangible configuration whereby parties and parts or lack of them are defined by a presupposition that, by definition, has no place in that configuration- that of the part of those who have no part” (Rancière, 1998: 28).

In other words, Rancière renames the traditional sense of politics which, equates it with the totality of procedures that unifies collectivities by producing consent, that organizes powers within the society, that assigns positions and roles and that legitimizes these procedures, as the police. The police, in this regard, implies a hierarchy in the society, which is based on the idea that people have different capacities, thus, the police assigns different positions and roles to the people depending on their capacities, which are specified by the police order itself. The hierarchical society of the police order is a united whole which is composed of counted and determined parts and which excludes the existence of the parts that have no part. However, Rancière suggests that the counting of parts is a disputable operation, it is always possible that a disagreement regarding the counting of the parts emerges. According to Rancière, this is what constitutes the essence of politics and what is excluded in the police order. The hierarchical order of the police represents inequality while politics opposes and disrupts this hierarchy through the presupposition of equality.

In the light of these, this paper will examine Durkheim’s concept of *anomie*, which as will be argued is a central theme for Durkheim’s functionalist approach on the basis of the distinction between *police* and

politics provided by Rancière. The centrality of *anomie* comes not from the cases to which it is applied but from the fact that Durkheim's consideration of *anomie* as a pathological and rare event. Apart from the fact that specifying anomic states or making a distinction between normal and pathological cases is in itself an ordering, a classification which leads to "...the set of procedures whereby the aggregation and consent of collectivities is achieved, the organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the systems for legitimizing this distribution" (Rancière, 1998: 28); it also has a central importance since it implies an organistic and functionalist view of society. In this respect, Durkheim has to consider *anomie* as pathological and rare. According to Durkheim, "...society is analogous to an organism in that it is a 'living' entity, composed of mutually interacting and interdependent parts, and regulated by internal processes of equilibrium and development" (Hawkins, 1980: 32). Therefore, regulation between interdependent parts requires certain rules and regulation by rules is the normal operation of society. However, *anomie*'s being a normal and common case would mean that society is neither organistic nor functionalist. Hence, *anomie* points out to a pathological and rare event for Durkheim.

On the other hand, an organistic and functionalist approach of society amounts to the configuration of society on the basis of the parts that are counted and have specific functions. Just as *anomie* is marginalized, disagreement, which lies at the bottom of politics according to Rancière, is marginalized as a rare and pathological event, whereas the normal, the healthy is designated as equilibrium, as consensus. Therefore, an organistic society is a *police* order. Rancière, with reference to sociology, states that "It wanted to reconstitute the social fabric such that individuals and groups at a given place would have the ethos, the ways of feeling and thinking, which corresponded at once to their place and to a collective harmony" (Rancière, 2006: 7). This paper will argue that at least Durkheim's sociology aims at the reconstitution of this social fabric.

In short, Durkheim's distinction between the normal and the pathological and his consideration of the *anomie* as a pathological case are problematic since the same distinction corresponds to the police that determines and counts the parts of the society. In this sense, Durkheim's distinction underlies the classification and organization of the society, which in turn, proves to be the normalization of *police* order. Firstly, the problem with this distinction is that on what grounds the normal can be distinguished from the pathological and who makes this distinction. And secondly, the *police* order, which assigns the people their proper capacities and positions is an obstacle before democracy and politics.

In this sense, the central argument of the paper is that Durkheim's functionalist view of society corresponds to Rancière's concept of police order that establishes and sustains social hierarchy while attributing specific roles to the parts of the society. In contrast, Durkheim's concept of *anomie*, which is a pathological state of normlessness and deregulation, corresponds to Rancière's concept of politics, which is the disruptive force challenging and creating a rupture in the police order. In this way, the paper argues that the conceptualization of *anomie* as a marginal and pathological event reflects the suppression of dissent in the police order. This, in turn, poses questions about who makes the distinction between the normal and the pathological, and how this distinction is utilized to sustain the status quo and hinder democratic politics in the name of the social order. This investigation, in turn, provides an interdisciplinary approach by connecting sociology and political philosophy, and fills a gap in the literature by emphasizing a connection between Durkheim's concept of *anomie* and Rancière's concept of politics.

2. ANOMIE AS A PATHOLOGICAL AND EXCEPTIONAL CASE IN DURKHEIM

2.1. The Etymology of *Anomie*

To start with the definition of the *anomie*, it might be said that there are two interpretations regarding the translation of the French word *anomie*. One considers *anomie* as normlessness: "most English translations render '*anomie*' as a state of 'normlessness,' 'deregulation' or 'normative confusion'..." (Meštrović and Brown, 1985: 81).

However, Meštrović and Brown argue Durkheim only uses the French word "dérèglement" as the synonym of *anomie* and that normlessness or deregulation is a poor translation. The word they propose as the correct translation is *derangement*, which "implies a condition of madness or something akin to sin" (Meštrović and Brown, 1985: 81). They further trace the etymological roots of the word *anomie* both in theology and ancient Greek. In terms of theology, *anomie* refers to sin but not in the sense of violation of

divine law or norms, “[r]ather, "anomia" includes within its definition thoughts, attitudes, and omissions - voluntary *or* involuntary - which focus on defilement, moral pollution, and the profaning of the sacred, in short, on variations of sacrilege” (Meštrović and Brown, 1985: 82).

On the other hand, the English translation of the ancient Greek word “a-nomos” is lawless, however, Meštrović and Brown argue that the definition of law for the ancient Greek was different today’s definition: “*Nomos* was derived from *Moir*a, meaning destiny, fate, and ‘that which is right’” (Meštrović and Brown, 1985: 83) and they refer to Cornford, who states that “The notion of ‘dispensation’ links together *Moir*a and *Nomos*.” (Cornford, 1957: 29, as cited in Meštrović and Brown, 1985: 83), and to Louis Gernet, who claims that “*nomos* is imperative rule derived from a collectivity that represents [etymologically] the principle of distribution” (Gernet, 1981:329, as cited in Meštrović and Brown, 1985: 83) for the Greeks.

Furthermore, Meštrović and Brown claim that Durkheim uses the French words “*règle*” and “*dérèglement*” when discussing *anomie*. At this point, they refer to the French dictionary *Littré* in which it is stated that “*Dérèglement*, *dérangement* are words expressing two nuances of moral disorder: What is *dérangé* is disarranged [hors de son rang] or is without place. What is *dérégulé* is out of rule [hors de la règle]” (Meštrović and Brown, 1985: 84). Although the etymological discussion on *anomie*, *Dérèglement* and *dérangement* might be prolonged, it is beyond the limits of this paper. Therefore, it should be enough to note that both of the interpretations of *anomie* will be taken into consideration in this paper.

2.2. The Concept of Anomie

When it comes to the concept of *anomie* in Durkheim, he refers to *anomie* firstly with regard to division of labor. He first distinguishes two kinds of solidarity, which are mechanical solidarity and organic solidarity. The fundamental characteristics of these two different kinds of solidarity is that in the mechanical solidarity, the individual is linked to society directly without any mediation while in the organic solidarity, the individual’s dependence on the society comes from the fact that she is also a part of society who depends on the other parts that forms society. In addition, in the former type of solidarity, society is composed of sentiments and beliefs which are organized in a totality and are common to all members, while in the second type of solidarity society denotes specialized, distinct functions that are related through definite relationships (Durkheim, 2002: 47).

Durkheim associates organic solidarity with the division of labor, or rather he argues division of labor produces organic solidarity. The effects of these kinds of solidarity on the individual, of course, are different. Mechanical solidarity indicates the likeness of the individuals while organic solidarity require that the individuals are different. In this sense, organic solidarity “is possible only to the extent that the individual personality is absorbed into the collective personality; the second [organic] is possible only if each has its own sphere of action, and therefore a personality” (Durkheim, 2002: 48). Furthermore, according to Durkheim, “one the one hand, the more labour is divided up, the greater the dependence on society, and, on the other hand, the more specialized the activity of each individual, the more personal it is” (Durkheim, 2002: 48). Therefore, “Each organ, in fact, has its special characteristics, its autonomy, and yet, the greater the unity of the organism, the more marked is the individuation of its parts” (Durkheim, 2002: 48). In this regard, as the specialization of each individual increases, their dependence on each other for the functions they have not specialize at also increases, thus society comprising of these individuals becomes more united and organized, according to Durkheim.

Durkheim mentions *anomie* at the end of the “Division of Labour”: “if the division of labour does not produce solidarity, it is because the relationships between organs are not regulated; they are in a state of *anomie*” (Durkheim, 2002: 56). In this sense, according to Durkheim the division of labor normally engenders solidarity and the state of *anomie* is an exceptional, even a pathological state. This can be seen in the beginning of the section on “The Abnormal Forms”:

Until now, we have studied the division of labour only as a normal phenomenon. But, like all social facts, and, more generally, like all biological facts, it manifests pathological forms which need to be analysed. Normally, the division of labour produces social solidarity, but it can happen to produce totally different or even opposite results (Durkheim, 2002: 55).

Therefore, it would make sense to suggest that, according to Durkheim, “‘a body of rules’ will normally come to regularize the relations of divided functions and that the absence of these rules creates a

lack of harmony of such function” (Marks, 1974: 330). The absence of these rules, on the other hand, is a pathological case which undermines the healthiness of the society provided by division of labor. He assumes the regulation of the divided parts of the society which function in line with the whole of society as the normal order of things while *anomie* which disrupts this normal order of things emerges as a pathological and exceptional case. Again, on the exceptionality of *anomie*, Durkheim states that:

the division of labour does not produce these consequences through some imperative of its own nature, but only in exceptional and abnormal circumstances. For it to be able to develop without having so disastrous an influence on the human consciousness, there is no need to mitigate it by means of its opposite. It is necessary and sufficient for it to be itself, for nothing to come from outside to deform its nature (Durkheim, 1984: 307).

The exceptionality of *anomie* in terms of division of labor implies that society is in an inclination towards equilibrium. When the mechanism of division of labor is left alone to its operation it will reach to an equilibrium point, therefore, *anomie* is not engendered by the division of labor, it is rather a pathological case, which is “an absence of recognized and positively accepted norms to regulate action” (Thompson, 2003: 61).

Durkheim refers to *anomie* in *Suicide* as well. In “Anomic Suicide”, he argues that people’s passions are unlimited: “the more one has, the more one wants, since satisfactions received only stimulate instead of filling needs” (Durkheim, 2005: 209). Thus, according to Durkheim, passions must be limited by something external to the individual since the individual is not capable of limiting her passions on her own. This external limiting force is society, which is provided by morality:

As a matter of fact, at every moment of history there is a dim perception, in the moral consciousness of societies, of the respective value of different social services, the relative reward due to each, and the consequent degree of comfort appropriate on the average to workers in each occupation. The different functions are graded in public opinion and a certain coefficient of well-being assigned to each, according to its place in the hierarchy (Durkheim, 2005: 210).

Morality and society seem to be crucially connected in Durkheim’s thought since Orru argues that Durkheim’s concept of *anomie* is related to his moral philosophy, according to which “society is the source of morality, and that the individual has no choice but to obey the rules of conduct preestablished by society” (Orru, 1987: 106). Therefore, society as the source of morality has a limiting influence over individuals. However, in the time of crises, or, transitions, which might be beneficial as well, society cannot exercise this limiting influence. Therefore, it becomes so that “The limits are unknown between the possible and the impossible, what is just and what is unjust, legitimate claims and hopes and those which are immoderate” (Durkheim, 2005: 213). In that case, “*anomie* becomes any form of deregulation or lack of cohesion from which society may suffer” (Orru, 1987: 107). Later, Durkheim asserts that the state of *anomie* occurs only intermittently and during acute crises, with the exception that in economy, *anomie* is chronic state. In this sense, it might be argued that for Durkheim *anomie* is a pathological, rare and exceptional case unless the aspect of social life in question is economy.

In the light of these, whether the first translation or the second translation of the word *anomie* is taken into consideration, Durkheim’s concept of *anomie* refers to a pathological and exceptional case. The underlying idea behind *anomie*’s position in Durkheim’s thought is his functionalist and organicist approach, which takes society as an organism composing of interrelated organs that carry out specific functions for the working of the society as a whole.

3. JACQUES RANCIÈRE'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN POLICE AND POLITICS

3.1. The Police

To start with, Rancière introduces a radical understanding of politics. He argues that what has been named as politics since the ancient times is “the set of procedures whereby the aggregation and consent of collectivities is achieved, the organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the systems for legitimizing this distribution” (Rancière, 1998: 28). He proposes to name this system of distribution and legitimization as the *police*. In this regard, *police* organizes the distribution of roles and places, determines which role and place is suited to whom and assigns these roles and place on the one hand, and on the other it legitimizes this distribution through ensuring consent.

The police is thus first an order of bodies that defines the allocation of ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of saying, and sees that those bodies are assigned by name to a particular place and task; it is an order of the visible and the sayable that sees that a particular activity is visible and another is not, that this speech is understood as discourse and another as noise (Rancière, 1998: 29).

The *police* firstly aims at the “partitioning the sensible”, which is “a general law that defines the forms of part-taking by first defining the modes of perception in which they are inscribed” (Rancière, 2001: 9). Rancière refers to the double sense of the word partition which indicates separation and exclusion on the one hand, and on the other, allowing participation. In this regard, “partitioning the sensible” points out to that in order to separate and exclude what is in the sensible, one must first define what is sensible. In defining the sensible, the *police* also defines what parts are included in the sensible and concludes that there are no parts except the existing parts, there are no parts beyond the sensible. “From Athens in the fifth century B.C. up until our own governments, the party of the rich has only ever said one thing, which is most precisely the negation of politics: there is no part of those who have no part” (Rancière, 1998: 14).

3.2. Politics

Politics, on the other hand, is something whose essence “is to disturb this arrangement by supplementing it with a part of the no-part identified with the community as a whole” (Rancière, 2001: 10). It is reserved for “whatever breaks with the tangible configuration whereby parties and parts or lack of them are defined by a presupposition that, by definition, has no place in that configuration- that of the part of those who have no part” (Rancière, 1998: 29). Therefore, politics points out to the existence of a part that has no part in the *police* order and brings forth this part. In this sense, politics and *police* are antagonistic to each other. The latter indicates consensus while the former brings dissensus in play: “The essence of politics is the manifestation of dissensus, as the presence of two worlds in one.” (Rancière, 2001: 10). At this point, Rancière gives the example of demonstration. According to him, the primary duty of the *police*, which, at this point, he uses in the conventional meaning as the law enforcement officer, is to break up the demonstration, rather than investigating or arresting the demonstrators, therefore its duty is to indicate that there is nothing to see, to hear or to say in the place where demonstration is occurring: “Move along! There is nothing to see here!”, hence the partitioning the sensible. The *police* presents us with the presence of one world in which we should move along since there is nothing to see there. The assertion of this world excludes the possibility that another world exists, in which there is something to see for us. Politics, at this point, which takes the form of a demonstration which the *police* tries to break up presents this other world, an alternative to the *police* order's world. More, politics presents two worlds existing in one world. Therefore, politics disrupts the partition of the sensible by the *police* order by supplementing the sensible with a part that has no part within the sensible, thus with a part that does not exist according to the partition of the sensible by the *police*. However, with this disruption of the *police* order, the sensible is transformed:

political activity is always a mode of expression that undoes the perceptible divisions of the police order by implementing a basically heterogenous assumption, that of a part of those who have no part, an assumption that, at the end of the day, itself demonstrates the sheer contingency of the order, the equality of any speaking being with any other speaking being (Rancière, 1998: 30).

Rancière refers to Aristotle's distinction between speech and voice on which he bases the political character of human, the political animal with regard to the distinction between *police* and politics. Aristotle, basically, asserts that voice is a capacity shared by all animals and used to express pleasure and pain. Speech, on the other hand, is a capacity specific to humans and used to express useful and harmful as well as just and unjust. This specific capacity of humans indicates their ability to perceive and make distinctions among useful and harmful, good and evil, just and unjust.

Although this distinction between speech and voice is given as a distinction on which politics is based, a distinction between humans who have voice and therefore who can only express pleasure and pain and humans who have speech who can also express what is just and unjust, this distinction is actually "one of the stakes of the very dispute that institutes politics" (Rancière, 1998: 22). The tale of plebs, who retreat to Aventine Hill, given by Rancière, is a significant example. Rancière, at this point, refers to the first secession of the plebs in 494 BCE, during which the plebs in the Roman Republic threatened to secede from Rome by retreating to Aventine Hill and demanded that the patricians met their economic, political, and social demands. (Perry, 2011: 75-76) According to Pierre-Simon Ballanche whom Rancière refers, this retreat is not a simple revolt of poverty and anger, rather it is disagreement on speech. The patricians consider the plebs as beings who have no capacity to speak, consequently there cannot be any stage on which the patricians and plebs come together and exchange words. On the other hand, the plebs retreat to the Aventine Hill, and they establish another order while presenting themselves as humans who have a capacity to speak. In this regard, their revolt is something other than a conflict regarding the interests of parties, it is, on the contrary, a conflict regarding the existence of parties, regarding the speech itself, a conflict which constitutes politics. (Rancière, 1995: 82).

Politics exists because those who have no right to be counted as speaking beings make themselves of some account, setting up a community by the fact of placing in common a wrong that is nothing more than this very confrontation, the contradiction of two worlds in a single world: the world where they are and the world where they are not, the world where there is something "between" them and those who do not acknowledge them as speaking beings who count and the world where there is nothing (Rancière, 1995: 27).

In this sense, the *police* implies a hierarchy in the society, which is based on the idea that people have different capacities, thus, the *police* assigns different positions and roles to the people depending on their capacities, which are specified by the *police* order itself. It should also be noted that Rancière repeatedly invokes the phrase 'police order' to refer to *any* hierarchical social order - the orders in which we all circulate, each and every day...to designate parliamentary legislation, executive orders, judicial decisions, and the vast array of economic arrangements" (Chambers, 2010: 61).

The hierarchical society of the *police* order is a united whole which is composed of counted and determined parts and which excludes the existence of the parts that have no part. Therefore, "Rancière's use of the term keeps alive the idea of the police as involving a social ordering that is enforced not merely by military- style intervention – armed men in uniforms – but more significantly by the idea of a proper social order" (May, 2008: 42). However, Rancière suggests that the counting of parts is a disputable operation and the idea of a proper social order can be disputed. It is always possible that a disagreement regarding the counting of the parts emerges. According to Rancière, this is what constitutes the essence of politics and what is excluded in the *police* order. The hierarchical order of the *police* represents inequality while politics opposes and disrupts this hierarchy through the presupposition of equality.

According to Rancière, equality is central to politics however, it is not a given to be actualized by politics or a goal, it is only a presupposition, a starting point that makes politics possible. Considering the plebs on the Aventine Hill, their retreat is not political because it actualizes equality or because their goal is equality. It is the other way around: Their retreat, their establishing another order is the presupposition of their equality to patricians. Their starting point is equality. The fact that they present themselves as equal collides two worlds, one in which they are not equal to patricians and one in which they are and politics occurs in this way. In addition, equality requires subjects and subjectification, which is "the production

through a series of actions of a body and a capacity for enunciation not previously identifiable within a given field of experience, whose identification is thus part of the reconfiguration of the field of experience” (Rancière, 1995: 35). Going back to the plebs on the Aventine Hill, they were not recognized as parts of the society, they were parts that have no part within the given *police* order. Their retreat to the hill, however, led to their emergence as identifiable part of the society, an emergence which occurred through presupposition of equality. In this regard, subjectification does not push subjects that do not exist into a given society, it transforms the way in which these subjects are defined in the *police* order. Once they were only subjects who fed the society through their work and who did not have any capacity to speak, their political action of creating another order in which they presented themselves as equals caused a rupture in the *police* order and they were acknowledged as equals.

In this way, disruption of the inegalitarian, hierarchical order of the *police* through the presupposition of equality reveals the contingency of the *police*. What lies at the basis of the *police* is the assumption that people have different capacities, therefore they are not equal. The *police*'s main function is to assign people their proper positions and places in line with their capacities on the basis of this assumption of inequality as well as to legitimize this assumption, to present it as a natural, normal order of things. The rupture and disruption in the *police* order through the presupposition of equality, which is the politics itself, discloses that this hierarchical order is not the natural and normal order of things at all. Politics displays the equality of anyone to anyone.

4. ANOMIE AND THE POLICE ORDER

Before the examination of *anomie* with regard to the *police* order, it was stated that in this paper both of the interpretations of the word *anomie* would be taken into consideration in this paper. Therefore, to start with the first meaning, “normlessness”, “deregulation”, “normative confusion”, it is quite clear that the absence of *anomie* represents a hierarchical order of *police*. In the absence of *anomie*, we are face to face with a society regulated in line with the established norms without any confusion. This, on the other hand, points out to a society in which everything is in its place.

The hierarchical order of *police* can be found in this interpretation of *anomie* in two ways. Firstly, norms inform the individuals as parts of the society about their proper places, positions and behaviors according to these places and positions, and regulate their conducts again in compliance with these. This function of norms and regulation is in line with Rancière's concept of the *police* which aims at the partitioning the sensible. Secondly, the existence of norms and regulation implies the presence of a hierarchy in the sense that there must be a mechanism that establishes norms and regulates the individuals' conducts in line with these norms. This mechanism seems in Durkheim's thinking to be society and morality. Although this mechanism is society, it nonetheless assigns people to their proper places and roles through establishing norms and ensuring regulation. This effect of society and morality might be interpreted as the “partitioning the sensible” function of *police* as well in the sense that society and morality, again, assign each part of the society to its proper place. Therefore, it is safe to suggest that Durkheim implies this partition when stating that “The different functions are graded in public opinion and a certain coefficient of well-being assigned to each, according to its place in the hierarchy” (Durkheim, 2005: 210).

The roots of the word “*anomie*” in Ancient Greek refer to the same hierarchical order as well, in the sense that the word “*nomos*” from which the word “*anomos*” is derived represents fate, destiny and “which is right”. The meaning of this word suggests that the fate of the individual is right, therefore the idea behind the word is that, again, everything and everyone should be in its proper position and place. Moreover, this also helps to the legitimization of the hierarchic order or *police*. It should be recalled at this point that Rancière defines *police* “as the set of procedures whereby the aggregation and consent of collectivities is achieved, the organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the systems for legitimizing this distribution” (Rancière, 1998: 28). In addition to this, according to Cornford and Gernet to whom Mestrovic and Brown refer, the idea of distribution is inherent to the Ancient Greek word “*nomos*”. Lastly, with regard to the second meaning, or, interpretation of the word “*anomie*” it should be recalled that the mentioned authors who trace the word “*anomie*”'s etymological roots argue that Durkheim uses the French words “*réglé*” and “*dérèglement*” while discussing *anomie*. The meanings of these words which they provide by referring to a French dictionary, again, point out to the hierarchical order of *police*: “*Dérèglement, dérangement* are words expressing two nuances of moral disorder: What is *dérangé* is

disarranged [hors de son rang] or is without place. What is *dérégulé* is out of rule [hors de la règle].” (Meštrović and Brown, 1985: 84). Both being without place or disarranged and being out of rule indicates that the normal order of things requires that everything is in its place in an arranged way and is regulated by rules.

Leaving aside the discussions on the meaning of *anomie*, the essential point is that Durkheim considers *anomie* as an exceptional, rare, and even, pathological case. The idea behind this consideration is Durkheim’s functionalist and organistic approach to society. Whitney Pope defines a functionalist

...as one who (1) views society as a whole composed of interrelated parts (i.e., as a system), (2) assumes a tendency toward system equilibrium, (3) considers how society or the social order is possible and, hence, (4) views structures in terms of their contributions to the perpetuation or evolutionary development of society, and (5) sees pervasive commonalities or consensus as the ultimate basis of social order (Pope, 1975: 361).

Durkheim’s views on the division of labor indicates that he consider “society as a whole composed of interrelated parts.” The division of labor results in the individual’s dependence on society since as her specialty on her function increases she becomes more dependent on others for the functions she is not specialized on. This dependence, in turn, increases the unity in society. The fact that in the normal order of things, this unity and solidarity within the society comes about as a normal result of the division of labor suggests that Durkheim “assumes a tendency toward system equilibrium.” Moreover, this functionalism is closely related to organicism. While touching upon the principles underlying Durkheim’s perspective M. J. Hawkins argues that “Of these principles, the most crucial is the notion that society is analogous to an organism in that it is a “‘living’ entity, composed of mutually interacting and interdependent parts, and regulated by internal processes of equilibrium and development” (Hawkins, 1980: 32). The functionalist and organicist approach of Durkheim gives a conception of society in which each of the interrelated and interdependent parts is placed in its proper position in order to function just as an organ within the human body functions properly. This functioning goes on interrupted unless an anomical event, which is pathological and harms the healthy, functioning condition of the society, emerges.

Taking these into consideration, the paper argues that Durkheim’s concept of *anomie* corresponds to Rancière’s understanding of politics. Whether we take the first interpretation, or translation, of the word “*anomie*”, which is “normlessness”, “deregulation” or “normative confusion”, or the second one, which is “derangement”, *anomie* denotes a rupture, a disruption in the normal order of things. On the other hand, as the words “norms”, “regulation” suggest a hierarchy, a determination of the proper places and roles, this normal order of things corresponds to the *police* order.

In this sense, Durkheim’s conception of society as functionalist and organic is a society of the hierarchically organized *police* order, in which each interrelated and interdependent part of the society is assigned to its proper place and position. The fact that he denotes this society as the normal and refers to *anomie* as an exceptional, pathological case is the legitimation of this *police* order. Durkheim has to take *anomie* as a pathological and exceptional case since his conception of society is based on the assumption that people have different capacities and therefore have different functions in the society, which comprises of interrelated and interdependent individuals. Society, in this sense, denotes the normal order of things in which, as long as the individuals remain in their proper places and positions, continues to function properly. In other words, society is a healthy, well-functioning organism. *Anomie*, in turn, disrupts this proper functioning whether it refers to an *anomie* in the division of labor, which might emerge as the fact that too many individuals are employed in a particular occupation, or to anomic suicide, which emerges as the result of a deranged state in society. Referring to the medical analogy, *anomie* is the disease which harms the healthy body. In this regard, to acknowledge *anomie* as a normal case means the destruction of the basic assumption underlying the functionalist and organistic conception of society since *anomie* reveals the contingency of this assumption and therefore, corresponds to Rancière’s understanding of politics.

CONCLUSION

This paper argues that Emile Durkheim’s concept of *anomie* corresponds to Jacques Rancière’s understanding of politics and Durkheim’s conception of organistic and functionalist society corresponds to

Rancière's concept of *police*. In order to do that, the paper firstly presents Durkheim's concept of *anomie* as a pathological and exceptional case and Rancière's distinction between *police* and politics. Then, the paper analyzes the concept of *anomie* with regard to the distinction between *police* and politics.

A thorough analysis of both distinctions, the paper indicates Durkheim's considers society an organism composing of functional parts that are assigned to specific positions and that provide the healthy functioning of society. This view, on the other hand, reflects Rancière's concept of police order that determines the parts of society as well as assigning the appropriate roles and positions to each part. In connection with this, Durkheim views *anomie* as a rare and pathological state that emerges when deregulation occurs in the well-functioning society, which culminates in the disruption of the social order. This deregulation and eventual disruption, in turn, destabilizes the social order and reveals the contingency that lies under the hierarchical order of society. For Rancière, however, by challenging the police order, the disruption in question becomes the politics itself since for him, politics occurs when those who have no part assert their equality by rejecting the hierarchical order and the roles assigned to them by the that order.

In this regard, the paper shows that *anomie* in Durkheim and politics in Rancière are rare and disruptive events. Yet, while Durkheim considers *anomie* as a pathological case that needs to be resolved, Rancière considers politics as a celebratory and necessary occurrence for equality and democracy.

Analyzing Durkheim's concept of *anomie* through the lens of politics in Rancière reveals the limitations of functionalist approach of Durkheim. Pathologizing and marginalizing *anomie* can be interpreted as pathologization and marginalization of dissent as well. In addition, a pathological understanding of *anomie* and dissent legitimizes and reinforces the social order, or the police in Rancière's terms. It also brings about crucial questions about who makes the distinction between the normal and the pathological, and how this distinction is utilized to sustain the status quo and hinder democratic politics in the name of the social order. Moreover, while a pathological understanding of *anomie* may be useful in understanding and maintaining social order, it may also lead to the repression of dissent and political agency.

While the paper provides a unique and novel approach to Durkheim's concept of *anomie* by utilizing Rancière's concept of politics through an interdisciplinary perspective, it is surely not without limitations. Firstly, the paper engages with these concepts on a theoretical level and without any empirical research the paper might be considered too abstract. Therefore, further empirical research surely prove to be useful for a broader analysis. In connection, the paper engages with extensive theories, which could limit an in-depth analysis of the concepts in questions. Yet, empirical research and an in-depth analysis of the thinkers' theories remain beyond the scopes of this paper. Lastly, the lack of existing literature on the connection between the concepts of *anomie* and politics points out to the uniqueness of the paper, it also points out to the lack of scholarly support for the paper.

In conclusion, the pathological and exceptional understanding of *anomie* indicates that *anomie* disrupts the healthy and normal order of things. This disruption reveals the contingency of the assumption on which Durkheim's conception of society rests. Therefore, Durkheim's concept of *anomie* corresponds to Rancière's understanding of politics, which disrupts the hierarchical and inegalitarian order of the *police*. Rancière considers politics as a rare event, just as Durkheim considers *anomie* as an exceptional case. However, while Durkheim conceptualizes this exceptionality as pathological, Rancière does not. Therefore, at least in terms of Durkheim's sociology, Rancière proves to be right to point out with reference to sociology: "It wanted to reconstitute the social fabric such that individuals and groups at a given place would have the ethos, the ways of feeling and thinking, which corresponded at once to their place and to a collective harmony" (Rancière, 2006: 7).

Ethics Statement: The author declares that ethical rules were followed in all preparation processes of this study. In case of detection of a contrary situation, all responsibility belongs to the author.

Conflict of Interest: There is no conflict of interest.

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